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In recent years economists  have expressed grow-
ing  concern  over  the  potential  adverse  social
consequences  of  technical  change  in  agriculture,
both  in  developed  and  developing  countries
[Falcon; Gotsch; Hightower; Schmitz and  Seckler].
These  critics,  while  recognizing  the  great  benefits
of  new  technology  under  appropriate  circum-
stances,  have  focused  attention  on two  important
problems.  The  first  is  that  the  welfare  gains  and
losses  produced  by  efficient  technological  in-
novations  have  sometimes  been  distributed  very
inequitably  among  different  groups  in  society.
Second,  technologies  that  are  socially  inefficient
for  particular  settings  have  sometimes  been
introduced.  The  latter  problem  is  especially
serious  in  developing  countries  which  are  con-
fronted  by  a  tempting  backlog  of  technology.
Factor  price  distortions  and  personal  biases  often
combine  to  raise  the  private  financial  return  to
investment  in  capital-intensive  technologies  above
the social return in these labor-abundant economies.
Gotsch  and Dorner,  among others, have empha-
sized  the need for  evaluating  distributional as well
as  efficiency  consequences  of  adopting  new  agri-
cultural  technology.  Regional  linear  programming
models,  such as  those used  in studies  by Wills and
Donovan,  are  useful  for  analyzing  the  micro-
economic  consequences  for  employment  and
income  distribution  of  technology  change  in  a
given  region.  But  there  is  need  for  a  theoretical
framework  to  guide  such  evaluations  of  distri-
butional  changes.  The  purpose  of this paper is  to
describe  a  simple  framework  for  evaluating short-
term  benefits  and  costs  of adopting  new  agricul-
tural  technologies  for  specific  agricultural  opera-
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tions.  The  approach  is not intended  for  aggregate
analysis  of general  technological change.
The Weed  Control Example
The  theoretical  framework  presented  here  was
originally  developed  to evaluate  the  welfare  impli-
cations  of  adopting  modern  weed  control  tech-
niques  in  sugarcane  plantations  and  other  areas
in  Northeast  Brazil.  Herbicides,  in  particular,  are
potentially  one  of  the  most  labor-saving  innova-
tions  developed  by  modern  agricultural  science,
and their  premature  adoption  in Northeast  Brazil,
in  response  to  government  incentives,  could  sub-
stantially  increase  rural  unemployment  in  one  of
the  most impoverished  areas of Latin America.
A  regional  linear  programming  model,  with
farm-size  decomposition,  is  being  utilized  in
work  underway  to  analyze  the  process  of  weed
control  technology  adoption  and  to  measure
associated  benefits  and  costs.  The  programming
analysis  takes  into consideration farm-type  hetero-
geneities,  seasonal  labor  supply  constraints,  envi-
ronmental  variations,  and  other factors not explic-
itly treated in this paper. The simplified theoretical
framework  described here is used to identify, theo-
retically,  the  benefits  and  costs  being  evaluated.
Although  the  discussion  in  this  paper utilizes  the
context of the weed control problem, the  proposed
framework should have applicability to certain sim-
ilar micro-level problems  of technological  change.
Classification  of Effects  of Technical  Change
This framework classifies impacts of technologi-
cal  change  by  origin  and  by  type.  Two  principal
causes  for adopting new technology  are  considered.
First,  technological  breakthroughs  or  exogenous
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market  forces  can  make  a  new  technique  mon
efficient  at  social  factor  prices.  Specifically,  the3
make  it  possible  to  expand  output  with  a  giver
resource  expenditure, or to produce a given  outpu
at  a lower  cost  when  all  inputs are  priced  at their
social  values.'  These  innovations,  or  forces,  arc
classified  as  efficiency-enhancing  developments  ir
table  1.  Secondly,  factor price distortions or othei
forms  of  government  intervention  can  make
adoption  of a  new  technique  privately profitable
but  not  socially  efficient  when  evaluated  at  the
true  social  values  of  the utilized  resources.  These
forces  are  identified  as  market  distortions  in table
1.  Common  examples  of policies  which  artifically
lower  the  capital/labor  price  ratio  include  direcl
subsidies  or  subsidized  credit  for  capital  inputs
(i.e.,  farm  machinery  and  agri-chemicals),  prefer-
ential  exemptions  from  import  levies,  special
exemptions from domestic  taxes, payroll taxes and
restrictive labor legislation,  and legislated minimum
wages  above equilibrium  levels.
The  framework  also  divides  welfare  effects
associated  with  technical  change  by  type,  specifi-
cally between efficiency and distributional changes.
Efficiency  changes  are  measured  with  respect  to
the  society's  resource  cost  of producing  a  given
output.  Distributional  changes  refer  to  the  dis-
tribution  of  welfare  benefits  and  costs  among
different  groups  in society,  and how these changes
relate to the society's  broad equity  goals.
Theoretical Framework
The  unit isoquant construct utilized by Timmer
for  evaluating  alternative  rice  milling technologies
in Indonesia provides a useful device  for describing
the  efficiency  and distributional  implications  of a
change  in  techniques  brought  on  by  "efficiency-
enhancing  developments"  or  by  policy-induced
"market  distortions."2 The  framework  is  useful
1Gittinger  discusses the difference between  "financial"
analyses based  on private  prices and  "economic"  analyses
based  on  social  prices.  The  correction  of market  prices,
which  may  be  distorted  by  several  government  policies
and  other  influences  simultaneously,  to  obtain  "true"
social prices  can  be difficult  in practice. But correction is
essential  to  evaluate  the  economic  desirability  of a  new
technology  or development project  for society  as a whole.
2The  unit  isoquant  concept  was  originally  developed
by  Farrell  to distinguish  and  measure  the relative  techni-
cal  and  economic  efficiency  of  different  firms  within
an  industry, a somewhat  different problem and application
from  that addressed  by Timmer  and by  this study.
Table  1.  Theoretical  classification  of  welfare
changes  from technical  change
Type  Efficiency  Distributional
Cause  changes  changes
Efficiency-  I  II
enhancing
developments  (Gains)  (Gains or Losses)
Market  III  IV
distortions  (Losses)  (Gains  or Losses)
primarily  for  evaluating  new  technologies  that
are  characterized by different  factor intensities but
which  do not increase  output significantly through
either yield-improving  or acreage-expansion  effects.
Unit  isoquant  ABC  in  figure  1 displays  a  hy-
pothetical  frontier  of  technically  efficient  weed
control  techniques  for  a  given  crop,  farm  type,
and  ecological  setting.  Capital  requirements  per
hectare,  measured  in  terms  of  the  social  values
of  utilized  materials  and  capital  services,  are
plotted on the vertical  axis, and labor requirements
on the  horizontal  axis.  All  techniques  on  the unit
isoquant  are  assumed  to  give  equally  effective
weed  control.3 By  introducing  the  labor-capital
isocost  line,  PR, in figure  1, Technique  B is deter-
mined  to be the most efficient technology  on ABC
The  lineary  segmented isoquants  in figures  1 and 2
which  generate  "corner  tangencies"  realistically
describe  the  technology  selection  process  within
a  cost-minimizing  linear  programming  framework.
Such  discrete  choices  of  technology  confront
farmers  in many real world situations as well.
Consider next the introduction of an "efficiency-
enhancing  development"-for  example,  a  new,
inexpensive,  granular  herbicide  represented  by
Point E in figure  1. The  new herbicide  is assumed
to  produce  the  same  yield  response  as  the  old
techniques  in  this  setting,  so  the  new  frontier
of  technically  efficient  methods  shifts  to  AEC
and Technique B becomes technologically  obsolete.
At  the  same factor price  ratio, represented by P'R'
3In  fact,  all  the  techniques  illustrated  in  figure  1
produced  statistically  equivalent yields in repeated experi-
mental  trials  within  one  Northeast  Brazil  study  area
[OSU/EMBRAPA/USAID  Project].  Also,  in  the  north-
east  Brazil  case  studies,  crop  acreage  levels  were  largely
determined  by  other  factors.  In  situations  where  the
choice  of weed  control technique  significantly  influenced
output,  this  effect  should  also  be  considered  in  the
analysis.
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parallel  to PR,  E  becomes  the  least  cost  and the
most  socially  efficient  weed  control  technique.
The  development  of  the  granular  herbicide
generates  P-P'  dollars  per  hectare  of  efficiency
benefits,  which  represents  the  reduced  resource
cost  of  producing  the  same  output  as  before.  If
the  new  technique  is  adopted  over  X  hectares,
the  aggregate  short-run  benefits  would  sum  to
X(P-P')  dollars  per  year,  assuming  one  crop  is
harvested  per  year.  In  the  short  run,  these  gains
will  be  captured  in  the  form  of  Schumpeterian
profits  by  early  adopting farms.  Over the long run
they  will  be  translated  into  increased  consumer's
and/or producer's  surpluses.
This  procedure  for  measuring  efficiency  bene-
fits  is  fundamentally  identical  to that  utilized by
Schmitz  and  Seckler  in  their  evaluation  of  the
social benefits derived from the introduction of the
mechanical  harvester  in  the processing  tomato in-
dustry,  although  they did not explain  the  process
within the unit isoquant  context. It should be rec-
ognized  that  these  measurements  may  hold  valid
only  for  the  short run,  because  over  the long run
the relative  social prices  of capital and labor could
change  greatly.  Schmitz  and  Seckler projected  the
cost  savings  of  the  mechanical  tomato  harvester
through  infinity, but this could be a risky practice
in a world of rapidly changing factor prices.
Fig.  1.
A (Sprayable  herbicide)
B(mule  cultivator)
i  IN  Er  C (Hoe)
What are the  distributional  losses caused by the
switch  in  weed  control  techniques?  Following
Schmitz  and  Seckler's  approach,  the  direct  costs
borne  by  displaced  hired  labor  can  be  measured
by  the  reduction  in  the  earnings  of  the  relevant
labor  force  after  the  change.  Theoretically,  if the
gains  received  by  "winners"  from  the  efficiency-
enhancing  new  technology  were  sufficient to com-
pensate  the "losers"  for their lost earnings, then all
groups  could  be  made  at least  as  well  off after  as
before  the  inovation.  In  reality,  however,  such
compensation  is rarely paid.  Returning to figure  1,
total  employment  in  weed  control  is  reduced  by
the  quantity (Nb  - Ne)  per hectare. Total earnings
in weed control  are reduced proportionately  under
the short-run  assumption of no change in the price
of  labor,  PL.  The  quantity  PL  (Nb  - Ne)  per
hectare  defines the upper  bound on  labor's losses.
On  the  other  hand,  if  100  percent  of the  dis-
placed  workers  find  equal-paying jobs  elsewhere,
their short-run  losses  are  zero.  Most often,  labor's
losses  will  lie  somewhere  between  these  two
extremes.
The  preceding  measurements  are short-run, and
assume  certain  inflexibilities  in  wages  and  labor
mobility  to  rationalize  the  existence  of  any  un-
employment.  In  a  depressed  area like the Brazilian
Northeast,  resulting  unemployment  could  persist
Fig.  2.
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for  a  long  time.
4 Also,  it  could  be  argued  that,
over  the long run,  displaced workers  might recoup
a  portion  of  their  losses  through  cheaper  food
prices. But even if technology adoption significant-
ly reduces  the market  price  for the  involved  com-
modity,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  displaced  workers
consume  sufficient  quantities  of the single item to
reclaim  a significant portion of their lost earnings.
Figure  2 utilizes a similar framework to evaluate
the  efficiency  and  distributional  implications  of a
switch  in  agricultural technology  caused  by factor
price  distortions.  Isoquant  ABCD  represents  the
set  of technically  efficient  weed  control  systems
available.  The  capital/labor  social  price  ratio  is
reflected  by isocost line KsLs, which reveals System
C  to  be  the  most  efficient  from  society's  per-
spective.  Assume, however, that direct and indirect
government  subsidies  for  capital  inputs, including
herbicides  and  machinery,  reduce the private price
of capital  by  50 percent,  while  the  price  of labor
remains  constant.  The  capital  axis  in  figure  2  is
scaled  according  to  the  social  value  of  capital,
but the  private  price  of a  dollar's  worth of capital
has  been  reduced  to  fifty  cents  by  the  subsidy.
Consequently,  the isocost line KpLp represents  the
new lower capital/labor  price  ratio confronting the
farmer, and motivates  the adoption  of B as the least
cost  technology.  Evaluated  by  the  social  oppor-
tunity  cost  of the utilized  resources  (as  indicated
by K~LS,  which  permits the purchase of Technology
B  and  is parallel  to KsLs), the utilization  of Tech-
nique  B  wastes  (K; -Ks)  dollars per hectare. These
are  the  "efficiency  losses" of Quadrant  III in table
1.  Adopting  farms realize  private  production  cost
savings  of (Ls - Lp)  x PL per hectare,5 but  their
subsidized  "modernization"  has  been costly indeed
to society. A switch to Technology B also  displaces
labor from  weed  control,  and  runs  the  risk of im-
posing distributional  losses on workers in the form
of higher unemployment  and reduced earnings.
To briefly cite  one example  of the potential im-
pact of factor price distortions,  preliminary  results
from  the  coastal  sugarcane  zone  of  Pernambuco
state  in Northeast  Brazil  indicate  that the  existing
combination  of  labor  payroll  taxes  and  indirect
subsidies  for herbicides, which  reduces  the relevant
capital/labor  price ratio by about 50 percent, could
eventurally  result in  the  privately  profitable  diffu-
4 Employment  adjustments  may  be  particularly  slow
for  developing  countries  because  they  commonly  import
herbicides  and  farm  machinery,  thereby  creating few new
jobs through linkages with the domestic industrial  sector.
5As  the  price  of labor  (PL) has  remained  constant,  it
can  be used as a numeraire  in determining the value  of the
two  isocost  lines,  KsLs  and  KpLp,  as  perceived  by  the
farmer.
sion of herbicides over the entire region, displacing
over 90  percent  of the labor previously engaged in
manual  weeding. On the other hand, in the  absence
of price  distortions,  it is unlikely herbicides  would
be  profitably  adopted  on  more  than one-third  of
the regional production  area.
The  point  that  should  be  emphasized  is  that
when  government  price  distortions  underlie  the
change  in  technology,  there  are  no  compensating
efficiency  gains  to  balance  against  the  welfare
losses  of  displaced  workers.  Unless  there  are
exceedingly  important  dynamic  or  other benefits
of  a  type  not  considred  here,  which justify  the
continuation  of  these  price-distorting  policies,
their continuation should be seriously  questioned.
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